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Numerous studies analyze the relationship between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance in
China’s listed companies, and their ﬁndings enrich our understanding of the mechanisms and eﬀectiveness
of executive compensation contracts. However, due to the diﬃculties in acquiring details about executive
compensation contracts, previous studies assume that the level of executive compensation is related to cer-
tain measures of accounting (such as return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE)) or market (stock
return) performance. To better understand the structure of executive compensation contracts, we hand col-
lected the details of 228 such contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed ﬁrms between 2004 and
2010. We provide descriptive empirical evidence on various characteristics of executive compensation con-
tracts, such as the degree of disclosure, the structure of compensation, the assessment measures used and
the method of calculating performance compensation. We aim to shed light on executive compensation by
presenting a more comprehensive understanding of executive compensation contracts in Chinese listed
ﬁrms.
To the best of our knowledge, the survey conducted by Pan et al. (2006) is the only other study of
executive compensation contracts in China. Based on 54 executive compensation contracts from 2002 to
2004, they show that executive performance evaluation is mainly based on ﬁnancial rather than non-ﬁnan-
cial measures. They also ﬁnd that executive performance evaluations are chieﬂy based on performance
budgets set by the board of directors. We re-examine this issue for several reasons.
First, the 54 executive compensation contracts collected by Pan et al. (2006) were disclosed between
2002 and 2004. Since 2004, there has been a series of changes in the compensation regulations, especially
in central-government-controlled ﬁrms. These regulation changes may have aﬀected the design of compen-
sation contracts and it is necessary to examine whether actual executive compensation contracts have
changed along with the regulations.
Second, it is well documented that the structure and eﬀectiveness of executive compensation depend on the
governance system (Liu et al., 2007; Fang, 2009; Xin and Tan, 2009). Pan et al. (2006) do not ﬁnd evidence of
compensation contracts varying with governance systems due to the limited number of contracts studied. This
study provides both a general descriptive analysis of compensation contracts and evidence of how governance
systems aﬀect the structure of such contracts.
Third, Banker and Datar (1989) ﬁnd that performance measure quality aﬀects the structure of exec-
utive compensation contracts. Accounting proﬁt is one of the chief performance measures in executive
compensation contracts. In 2007, Chinese listed companies implemented a new accounting standards sys-
tem that diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the old accounting standards. For example, the new standards intro-
duce fair value measurement and management is aﬀorded much more discretionary choice. These
changes have certainly had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on accounting information quality. Ke et al. (2011)
ﬁnd that the implementation of the new accounting standards has reduced the sensitivity of executive
compensation and accounting proﬁtability. In this study, we examine whether the use of accounting
information in compensation contracts diﬀers before and after the implementation of the new accounting
standards.
Finally, signiﬁcant changes in the content disclosed and level of disclosure in compensation contracts have
taken place since 2004, which means we can now collect more information from compensation contracts. For
example, we are now able to study the weighting of diﬀerent performance measures and analyze speciﬁc per-
formance assessment formulas.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the related compensation reg-
ulation background and provides a review of the executive compensation literature. In Section 3, we pro-
vide descriptions of the sample compensation contracts. A detailed analysis of compensation contracts is
provided in Section 4, including the assessment criteria used, performance evaluation, the use of ﬁnancial
performance measures and structure. Section 5 concludes the study and discusses directions for future
executive compensation studies.
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2.1. Background of compensation regulation in China
2.1.1. Regulation of compensation disclosure
Article 61 of the Securities Act 1999 states that companies with publicly listed stocks or bonds should dis-
close in their annual reports the resumes of all directors, supervisors and top managers together with their
shareholdings in the company. The Companies Law, which was promulgated in 1999 and revised in 2005,
requires that “a company shall regularly disclose to its shareholders information about remunerations
obtained by the directors, supervisors and top managers from the company.” Both the Securities Act and
Companies Law have laid the foundation for compensation disclosure in limited liability corporations.
Before 1997, executive compensation disclosure was not well regulated. In 1997, a new accounting standard
(Related Party Transactions) was issued by theMinistry of Finance (MOF) that deﬁnes keymanagement person-
nel as related parties and thus mandates that their compensation must be disclosed as the main transaction of a
related party. However, as there were no detailed disclosure rules, compensation disclosures diﬀered greatly in
both format and content.
The second disclosure requirement – Content and Format of Annual Reports – of the Format and Content
of Information Disclosure by Companies with Public Oﬀering Securities regulations issued by the China Secu-
rities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 1997 had a great eﬀect on compensation disclosure. It requires listed
companies to disclose more details of executive compensation and was revised seven times between 1998 and
2012.4 The 2001 version requires that companies disclose the compensation decision-making process and the
determinants of compensation for directors, supervisors and senior managers, and the total amount of com-
pensation received by the top three directors and senior managers. It also requires the separate disclosure of
independent directors’ allowances and other beneﬁts. The 2005 version requires companies to disclose the total
compensation of each individual director, supervisor and senior manager. Thus, studies conducted before
2005 use only the top three directors’ or managers’ total compensation, and studies conducted after 2005 typ-
ically use individual compensation data for the CEO or board chairperson. In 2007, the requirements changed
again to mandate the disclosure of the compensation committee’s duties and the implementation of stock-
based incentive plans. These disclosure regulations have contributed signiﬁcantly to increasing the transpar-
ency of executive compensation.
With the establishment of the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), the CSRC issued the Content and For-
mat of the Annual Report of GEM Listed Companies in 2009. This document stipulates the standards for
executive compensation disclosure in GEM companies. It requires a summary report of the compensation
committee’s duties under the board of directors, including the audit opinion of the disclosed compensation
of directors, supervisors and senior managers; clariﬁcation of whether the company has established a sound
and eﬀective system to assess its directors, supervisors and senior managers; and the incentive system and
its implementation. The report must also include a veriﬁcation opinion on whether the authorization process
in the implementation of the company’s stock-based incentive plan is compliant and whether the exercise con-
dition is fulﬁlled. This report requirement was revised in 2013 and now GEM companies are required to dis-
close their decision-making processes and the determinants of compensation for directors, supervisors and
senior managers, in addition to the actual payments made to each of them.2.1.2. Regulation of compensation contract structure
There is little evidence regarding the compensation regulations used by local governments in local-govern-
ment-controlled companies. Some studies, such as those of Chen et al. (2005, 2009, 2010), ﬁnd systematic dif-
ferences in the compensation structure of companies in diﬀerent regions and thus imply that local governments
have diﬀerent executive compensation regulations. However, due to the complexity of local government struc-
ture, we could not obtain any information on local government regulations covering executive compensation.4 It was revised in 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2012.
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controlled companies.
Since the implementation of the annual compensation system in 2002, the State-owned Assets Super-
vision and Administration Commission (SASAC) has required that executive compensation in govern-
ment-controlled companies must not be higher than 12 times the average employee salary in the ﬁrm.
Yueda Investment, for example, uses this multiple as its executive compensation determinant. The con-
tract reads as follows: “annual compensation is formed by basic salary and performance compensation.
The basic salary is determined by the annual budget set by the compensation committee and the base
should be two or three times the previous year’s average employee salary. Performance compensation is
determined by the evaluation of executives’ performance relative to their agreed targets and responsibil-
ities. In principle, the total annual compensation should not be higher than 10 times the average
employee salary.” However, the enforcement of this ceiling is very loose and many executives’ salaries
are much higher than the ceiling.
In 2003, the SASAC published the Interim Measures on Performance Evaluation of Executives in Cen-
tral-government-controlled Companies (the Interim Measures), which require companies to design incen-
tive contracts based on performance evaluation. The evaluation system includes annual and three-year
evaluations. The annual evaluation measures include annual proﬁt (30%), ROE (40%) and industry-speciﬁc
measures (30%). The three-year evaluation measures include the state-owned asset increment rate (40%),
three-year core operating income average growth rate (20%), three-year annual performance evaluation
result (20%) and industry-speciﬁc measures (20%).
The SASAC revised the Interim Measures three times: in 2006, 2010 and 2013. The evaluation system
between 2004 and 2009 placed more emphasis on accounting proﬁt measures. From 2010 to 2012, the ROE
measure was replaced by economic value added (EVA), which carried a weight of 40% in the annual evalua-
tion. The revised version in 2013 further enhanced the use of EVA by increasing the weight to 50% in most
enterprises in the annual evaluation and replaced the sales growth rate with total asset turnover to assess per-
formance eﬃciency in the three-year evaluation.
To reinforce the implementation of the Interim Measures, the SASAC has introduced various other com-
plementary measures on executive compensation. For example, after the Interim Measures on the Compensa-
tion Management of Executives in Central-government-controlled Companies were published in June 2004,
the SASAC published the Supplementary Regulations on Executives’ Annual Performance Evaluation in Cen-
tral-government-controlled Companies and other regulations. The compensation incentive system in central-
government-controlled companies has been progressively reﬁned. In 2006, the SASAC and the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) jointly published the Trial Procedures for the Implementation of Stock-based Incentives in
Government-controlled Listed Companies. Later, the equity-based incentive compensation system was intro-
duced and implemented in government-controlled listed companies. In 2007, the SASAC published a supple-
mentary regulation on executives’ term performance evaluations. These supplementary regulations serve
important functions in implementing the Interim Measures and standardizing compensation systems in cen-
tral-government-controlled companies.
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS) and other ministries jointly issued the
Further Guidance to Standardize Executives’ Compensation Contracts in Central-government-controlled
Companies (the Guidance), which formally classiﬁes executive compensation into basic annual salary, per-
formance salary and middle- to long-term incentive beneﬁts. Whereas the basic annual salary is to be paid
in monthly installments, the performance salary is to be paid in a lump sum (or by installments) following
a performance evaluation. The Guidance clearly states that in central-government-controlled companies,
executives’ basic annual salaries must be linked to the previous year’s average employee salary. Perfor-
mance salaries must also be determined by annual performance evaluation results and there should be
a cap on executive compensation. However, the enforcement and implementation of the Guidance is
not yet clear.
The MOF and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) have set explicit regulations on
executive compensation in ﬁnancial institutions. To standardize compensation contracts in ﬁnancial insti-
tutions following the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, the MOF published the Announcement of Executive
Compensation in Government-controlled Financial Institutions (the Announcement) in 2009. The
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in 2008 could not be higher than 90% of the annual compensation in 2007. Further, executive compensa-
tion had to be adjusted downward by 10% if an institution’s performance was weaker in 2008 than in
2007. In 2010, the CBRC published the Commercial Bank Compensation Regulation Guidance, which
requires that basic salaries in commercial banks not exceed 35% of total salaries and that performance
salaries be determined by performance evaluation and not be more than three times greater than the basic
salary.
2.2. Literature review
Much research has been conducted on executive compensation in China’s listed companies. We summarize
this research under three main headings.
2.2.1. Is executive compensation based on ﬁrm performance?
Early studies fail to ﬁnd a link between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance (Wei, 2000; Li, 2000).
With the introduction of pay-for-performance compensation regulations and improvements in corporate gov-
ernance, more recent studies have discovered a signiﬁcant positive relationship between compensation and
performance (Du and Qu, 2005; Fang, 2009). Fang (2009) ﬁnds that although the positive relationship
between executive compensation and performance exists, it is asymmetric. The magnitude of the growth in
compensation when performance improves is signiﬁcantly higher than the magnitude of the decline in compen-
sation when performance weakens.
2.2.2. What are the determinants of pay–performance sensitivity?
If executive compensation is based on a company’s performance, then the question naturally arises as to the
factors that aﬀect the pay–performance relationship. Zhang and Shi (2005) ﬁnd that executive compensation is
more sensitive to ﬁrm performance in ﬁrms with higher proportions of independent directors, within the com-
pensation committees of boards of directors and where the roles of chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) and board
chairperson are separated. Xiao and Peng (2004) also ﬁnd that pay–performance sensitivity is lower when
the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. The relationship is again asymmetric: it increases with an
improvement in ﬁrm performance, but decreases as ﬁrm performance deteriorates. Liu et al. (2007) shows that
the usefulness of accounting performance in compensation contracts is inﬂuenced by the institutional environ-
ment, in that accounting information in executive compensation contracts is less useful when there is a greater
degree of government intervention and more useful for companies in more competitive industries. Wu and Wu
(2010) ﬁnd that the level of compensation increases with the level of managerial control and that the control
eﬀect is more pronounced in non-government-controlled companies than in their government-controlled
counterparts.
Another stream of research investigates the eﬀect of accounting information quality on pay–perfor-
mance sensitivity. Bi and Zhou (2007) show that accounting information quality has a negative eﬀect
on the relationship between executive compensation and accounting performance, and that the negative
eﬀect varies with the institutional environment. Ke et al. (2011) similarly show that after the adoption
of more principle-based accounting standards, the sensitivity of executive compensation and accounting
performance declines signiﬁcantly.
Another factor that aﬀects the relationship between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance is the
market environment in which a ﬁrm operates. Xin and Tan (2009) examine the eﬀect of market reform on
compensation contracts in government-controlled companies and ﬁnd that more developed markets boost
the sensitivity of executive compensation to ﬁrm performance.
2.2.3. Compensation regulation and managerial perks
Because of the various restrictions on executive compensation, managers are expected to enjoy more
managerial perks to compensate for lower salaries. Chen et al. (2005) ﬁnd consistent results. Chen
et al. (2009) further ﬁnd that the probability of management fraud is positively related to compensa-
tion regulations. Chen et al. (2010) extend previous studies by providing evidence of a trade-oﬀ
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gerial perks are higher in years and regions with higher marketization indices, and that a higher pro-
portion of managerial perks are replaced by executive compensation.
In summary, the majority of previous studies use accounting performance such as ROA or ROE to examine
the sensitivity of executive compensation to ﬁrm performance. However, these studies fail to discuss the details
of executive compensation contracts, which may result in an omitted variable problem in the research design.
We attempt to open up the “black box” of companies’ compensation contracts and provide some guidance for
future research on executive compensation in China.3. Research sample
As discussed in the institutional background section, China’s listed companies are only required to disclose
certain compensation information in their annual reports based on the disclosure guidance published by the
CSRC. Although the regulations require information such as the form and amount of executive compensa-
tion, they do not require the disclosure of the details of executive compensation contracts. We hand-collected
228 compensation contracts that were voluntarily disclosed by listed companies between 2004 and 2010. The
details of these contracts are available from the CNINFO website (http://www.cninfo.com.cn/). As of Decem-
ber 31, 2010, there were 2141 listed companies with A shares in China and about 11% of these companies vol-
untarily disclosed their executive compensation contracts.
Whether the disclosed contracts were actually executed is debatable. Among the companies that disclosed
their compensation contracts, only some explicitly reported the execution of the contracts.5 For the companies
that did not do so, we verify the execution by examining whether the companies’ actual compensation was the
same as the amount calculated based on the agreement in the contract.6 Although we could not verify the con-
tracts individually, we conclude that they were executed fairly well according to the validity of the publicly
disclosed contracts.
Table 1 presents statistics of the sample compensation contracts. Panel A presents the annual distribution
of the sample between 2004 and 2010. The 228 executive compensation contracts were disclosed by 201 com-
panies, of which 25 companies disclosed two contracts and two companies disclosed three contracts. Before
2007, few companies disclosed their executive compensation contracts. The number increases gradually after
2008, with 59 executive compensation contracts being disclosed in 2010. Among the 228 contracts, 89 (39%)
are from non-government-controlled companies. Of the 139 (61%) contracts disclosed by government-controlled
companies, 41 were disclosed by central government-controlled companies. Local-government-controlled compa-5 For example, in its 2008 annual report, Shenzhen Energy (stock code 000027) states that “the compensation and evaluation committee
has evaluated the implementation of the compensation contracts of directors, supervisors and senior management personnel and
conﬁrmed that the compensation of directors, supervisors and senior management personnel has been implemented and is the same as the
amount in the compensation contracts.” The actual payments to executives are also disclosed: “The annual-salary structure was
implemented for the chairman and general managing director, which consists of basic salary, performance compensation and incentive
annual salary. The basic salary is RMB240,000 annually and is paid monthly at RMB20,000. The performance and incentive annual
compensation are granted after the annual evaluation, 80% of which is paid immediately after completion of the evaluation and the
remaining will be paid in the subsequent year. The 2007 chairman performance and incentive compensation was RMB670,000 in total,
80% of which was granted in 2008 and the residual 20% has been withheld. The CEO’s (Mr. Li Bin) performance and incentive
compensation was RMB636,000 in 2007, 80% of which was granted in 2008 and the residual 20% has been delayed.”
6 For example, Hangzhou Jiebai’s (stock code 600814) 2006 executive compensation contract states that executive annual salaries include
a basic salary and performance compensation: the basic salary is RMB120,000 and the performance compensation is paid as 100% of the
basic salary if the proﬁt target (RMB28,000,000) set by the board of directors is achieved. If the proﬁt is below RMB40,000,000, then a 1%
change in proﬁt corresponds to a 3% change in the performance compensation based on the basic salary. If the proﬁt reaches between
RMB40,000,000 and RMB60,000,000, then the performance compensation is based on 0.5% of the incremental proﬁt. If the proﬁt exceeds
RMB60,000,000, then the performance compensation is based on 0.3% of the incremental proﬁt. The chairman and CEO’s compensation
packages are based on this standard. Other executives’ compensation is about 50–70% of the standard. We compare the actual
compensation with the disclosed compensation structure to see whether the contract was executed. The 2006 realized proﬁt was
RMB62,302,571 and the total compensation based on the contract should have been RMB501,200. We ﬁnd that the actual payment of
compensation to the CEO was the same amount. We thus conclude that the contract was fully executed.
Table 1
Distribution of executive compensation contracts by year and ownership.
Total 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Panel A. Distribution by year
All sample contracts 228 23 17 8 19 51 51 59
Non-government controlled 89 1 4 3 8 21 24 28
Government controlled 139 22 13 5 11 30 27 31
Including
Central government controlled 41 3 3 1 1 9 11 13
Local government controlled 98 19 10 4 10 21 16 18
Non-government controlled Local government controlled Central government controlled
Panel B. Sample percentage of the total population by ownership
Number of contracts disclosed 89 98 41
Total number of listed companies 1081 677 355
Percentage 8% 14% 12%
Note: The total number of listed companies is as at December 31, 2010. Ultimate control data was extracted from CSMAR.
Table 2
Distribution of executive compensation contracts by industry.
Industry Number of compensation contracts Total number of companies Percentage
Manufacturing: pulp, paper and publishing 6 38 16
Media and culture 4 26 15
Agriculture, forestry, animal and ﬁshing 6 41 15
Construction 6 41 15
Mining 7 48 15
Transportation and warehousing 9 71 13
Manufacturing: oil, chemistry and plastic 27 214 13
Manufacturing: medicine, biological products 16 131 12
Manufacturing: electronics 14 117 12
Wholesale and retail trade 13 114 11
Utilities: electricity, gas and water 8 71 11
Manufacturing: mechanical, equipment and instruments 39 354 11
Manufacturing: agri-food and beverage 9 82 11
Manufacturing: metal and non-metal 18 164 11
Information technology 15 146 10
Realty business 13 127 10
Social services 6 59 10
Manufacturing: textile, clothing and fur 7 69 10
Manufacturing: others 2 21 10
Conglomerate 3 55 5
Manufacturing: wood and furniture 0 9 0
Financial and insurance 0 38 0
Total 228 2036 11
Note: The number of companies is as at December 31, 2010. Industry classiﬁcations are from the WIND ﬁnancial database.
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voluntarily disclosed their executive compensation contracts.77 We analyze the characteristics of the companies that voluntarily disclose their compensation contracts. The dependent variable is a
measure of whether the company voluntarily discloses its compensation contracts. The independent variables include internal governance
measures (the largest shareholder’s ownership percentage, whether the company is government controlled and the ratio of independent
directors), external governance measures (a cross-listing indicator, a local marketization index and a GEM indicator), company
characteristics (age of the company since IPO, debt ratio and company size), and time and industry dummies. The regression results show
that companies with a more recent IPO and with government ownership are more likely to voluntarily disclose their compensation
contracts. The other variables have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of voluntary disclosure.
Table 3
Disclosure of executive compensation contracts.
Degree of disclosure Total Non-
government
controlled
Local
government
controlled
Central
government
controlled
Total 228 89 98 41
No disclosure of evaluation measures or performance
compensation calculation formula
43 19% 27 30% 11 11% 5 12%
Disclosure of evaluation measures only 31 14% 15 17% 14 14% 2 5%
Disclosure of calculation formula only 25 11% 13 15% 6 6% 6 15%
Disclosure of both evaluation measures and performance
calculation formula
129 57% 34 38% 67 68% 28 68%
Note: The percentages are calculated as the number of disclosures over the total number of contracts in each category.
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the highest number (27) of disclosed contracts. In terms of the percentage among companies in the same indus-
try, the pulp, paper and publishing industry has the highest percentage of disclosed contracts (16% with six
contracts). No companies in the ﬁnancial and insurance industry voluntarily disclosed any compensation
contracts.
4. Analysis of executive compensation contracts
4.1. Degree of executive compensation disclosure
Some of the contracts are disclosed in detail, yet others provide only basic information. We assess the
degree of disclosure by examining whether the evaluation measure and the method of computing the perfor-
mance compensation are provided. The results are shown in Table 3.
Among the 228 compensation contracts, 129 (or 57% of the total) disclose the evaluation measure and the
formula for computing performance compensation, 25 (or 11% of the total) disclose only the formula for
performance compensation, 31 (or 14% of the total) disclose only the evaluation measures and 43 (or 19%
of the total) provide only the method of determining the executive compensation in principle, without any
details.
We then classify the contracts by central-, local- and non-government-controlled ﬁrms. Among the 43 con-
tracts that do not give evaluation measures and computing formula details, the majority (27 cases) are from
non-government-controlled ﬁrms and only ﬁve cases are from central government-controlled ﬁrms. In com-
parison, among the 129 contracts that disclose the evaluation measures and computing formula details, the
majority (67 and 28 cases, respectively) are from local- and central-government-controlled ﬁrms. The percent-
age of ﬁrms tells the same story. Whereas about 68% of the contracts from government-controlled ﬁrms
include evaluation measures and computing formula details, only 38% of the non-government-controlled ﬁrms
include the same details. In summary, government-controlled ﬁrms tend to disclose more information in com-
pensation contracts than non-government-controlled ﬁrms.
4.2. Contract parties in executive compensation contracts
In the conventional type of principal-agent relationship, shareholders are the principals and managers are
the agents. Hence, boards of directors represent shareholders in setting managers’ compensation contracts.
The contract parties in compensation contracts are normally the CEO or the senior management team led
by the CEO. However, in many Chinese listed companies, directors such as chairpersons and supervisors
are also considered to be contract parties. Thus, the contract parties may include the chairperson (and other
directors), the CEO (and his or her management team) and supervisors.
Table 4 presents statistics of the contract parties. Among the 228 executive compensation contracts, 97 con-
tracts were designed for the CEO and the management team, about 43% of the total sample. For example,
Table 4
Contract parties in compensation contracts.
Total Non-government
controlled
Local government
controlled
Central government
controlled
228 89 98 41
CEO and other senior executives (excluding
directors and supervisors)
97 28 45 24
(43%) (31%) (46%) (59%)
Directors, supervisors and senior executives
(including CEO)
60 32 20 8
(26%) (36%) (20%) (20%)
Directors and senior executives (including CEO but
excluding supervisors)
47 24 17 6
(21%) (27%) (17%) (15%)
Managers (including middle-level and subsidiary
managers)
6 1 4 1
(3%) (1%) (4%) (2%)
Directors and supervisors (excluding managers) 5 2 3 0
(2%) (2%) (3%) (0%)
All employees (including directors) 5 0 3 2
(2%) 0% (3%) (5%)
No clear speciﬁcation of parties 8 2 6 0
(4%) (2%) (6%) 0%
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utives. Sixty of the contracts were designed for the chairperson, CEO and supervisors, representing approxi-
mately 26% of the total sample. One example is the contract disclosed by Redsun (stock code 000525) in 2008.
Forty-seven contracts (or 21% of the total) include the chairperson and CEO, but exclude supervisors as the
contract parties.
The diﬀerence in contract parties included in compensation contracts casts doubt on the eﬀectiveness of
performance-based executive compensation. According to the basic principle of corporate governance, the
board of directors (and mainly the compensation committees of the board) sets executive compensation
and evaluates the subjects’ performance, and supervisors supervise the directors and executives’ actions. If
the board of directors sets the compensation for both directors and supervisors, then the monitoring role
of the board and supervisors may be thrown into doubt, which may jeopardize the eﬀectiveness of executive
compensation contracts. Whether this issue has receded since the introduction of more stringent corporate
governance regulations is an interesting issue. The percentage of contracts with a chairperson as the contract
party in this sample is 49%, which is less than the 70% reported by Pan et al. (2006). The percentage of con-
tracts with supervisors as the contract parties is 29%, compared to the 36% in Pan et al. (2006). We thus
observe an improvement in the past decade. Compared to government-controlled ﬁrms, non-government-con-
trolled ﬁrms tend to have more compensation contracts for the chairperson of the board of directors, indicat-
ing that more chairpersons of non-government-controlled ﬁrms are involved in business operations.4.3. Evaluation measures of performance in executive compensation contracts
Baker et al. (1988) argue that a company’s compensation policy consists of three components: the level,
functional form and components of compensation. The functional form includes pay–performance sensitivity
and the deﬁnition of performance evaluation measures. They argue that the level of compensation determines
a company’s ability to attract employees and that the functional form provides incentives that could determine
the future behavior of employees who are hired. The performance evaluation measures that should be included
in managerial compensation contracts remain in question. Holmstrom (1979) suggests that measures that bet-
ter reﬂect information on managers’ eﬀort be included. Accounting information plays a stewardship role that
reﬂects manager eﬀort. Thus, accounting proﬁts are typically used to evaluate managerial performance. The
more strongly accounting proﬁt and manager eﬀort are related, the more eﬀective the proﬁt-based compensa-
tion contract. Stock price and non-ﬁnancial measures can also be used to measure managers’ output. Accord-
ing to Banker and Datar (1989), the eﬀectiveness of compensation contracts depends on the extent to which
the performance evaluation measures therein measure manager eﬀort. The higher the accuracy and the less
Table 5
Evaluation measures used in executive compensation contracts.
Total 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Disclosure of evaluation measures 160 21 15 8 14 34 32 36
Total number of evaluation measures 715 82 64 31 79 145 152 162
Average number of evaluation measures in each contract 4.5 3.9 4.3 3.9 5.6 4.3 4.8 4.5
Including
Average number of ﬁnancial measures 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.6 3.6 2.9 3.1 2.8
Average number of non-ﬁnancial measures 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.3 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.7
Average number of evaluation measures based on proﬁt 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4 1.8 2.5 1.9
Average number of evaluation measures based on non-proﬁt measures 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.9
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vier the weight of this measure in the compensation contract.
Murphy (2001) examines 177 executive compensation contracts in US companies, which include 428 perfor-
mance measures, both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial. Almost every company uses accounting measures in their
annual monetary incentive plans. These accounting measures include sales, net proﬁt, proﬁt before tax, oper-
ating proﬁt and EVA, among others. After analyzing the performance measures of the compensation contracts
of 317 companies, Ittner et al. (1997) conclude that 312 companies use accounting measures. Of these compa-
nies, 28.5% use earnings per share, 27.2% use net proﬁt, 25.3% use operating proﬁt or proﬁt before tax, 13.7%
use sales and 12.8% use cash ﬂow, with each company using 1.7 ﬁnancial measures on average. The authors also
reveal that 114 (or 36%) of the companies use non-ﬁnancial measures in their incentive plans. Of these, 36.8%
use customer satisfaction measures, 28% use non-ﬁnancial strategic objective measures and 21% use product
and service quality measures, with each company using 2.3 non-ﬁnancial measures on average.
Table 5 shows the overall evaluation measure statistics used in our sample of executive compensation con-
tracts. Among the 228 sample contracts, 160 disclosed evaluation measures between 2004 and 2010. The total
number of evaluation measures used is 715, comprising 475 ﬁnancial measures, 237 non-ﬁnancial measures,
and 3 fair value measures. All 160 contracts use ﬁnancial measures, with each company using three on average.
Table 6 shows detailed statistics on the use of evaluation measures. Panel A presents the use of ﬁnancial
measures. Compared with the results of Pan et al. (2006), contracts using a single ﬁnancial measure decreased
from 42% to 33% (52 contracts) whereas contracts using multiple ﬁnancial measures increased from 58% to
68% (108 contracts). These changes indicate that more companies are now using multiple ﬁnancial measures
to evaluate the performance of top executives. Among the 52 contracts using a single ﬁnancial measure, the
majority (43 contracts, or 27%) use the proﬁt measure, but others use ROE, sales and EVA.
The proﬁt measure is the most important ﬁnancial measure. Among the 160 contracts that disclose execu-
tive evaluation measures, 146 (or 91%) use proﬁt measures. The deﬁnition of proﬁt varies: 72 contracts deﬁne
it as net proﬁt, 33 deﬁne it as proﬁt before tax, 19 do not clearly deﬁne it, 12 use the net proﬁt after non-recur-
ring item adjustment and the remainder use the net proﬁt growth rate.
Other measures such as sales and ROE are also frequently used, accounting for 39% and 32% of the total,
respectively. About 11% of the contracts use accounts receivable turnover, 7% use inventory turnover and 8%
use cash ﬂow as ﬁnancial measures. For example, in addition to the proﬁt measure, Hailu-Boiler’s (stock code
002255) 2009 executive compensation contract includes inventory, accounts receivable and total asset turn-
overs, reﬂecting the company’s operating eﬃciency. Consistent with the results of Pan et al. (2006), we ﬁnd
that Chinese listed companies continue to use proﬁt, sales, ROE and other measures that reﬂect their proﬁt-
ability to evaluate executives. However, we also observe an increasing trend of including measures that reﬂect
the operational eﬃciency of assets and cash ﬂow adequacy, further diversifying the use of ﬁnancial measures.
Panel B reports the use of non-ﬁnancial measures. Among the 160 contracts, 79 (or 49%) use non-ﬁnancial
measures, compared with only 34% in the study of Pan et al. (2006). This result shows that more companies
are using non-ﬁnancial measures to evaluate their executives. The safety measure (43 contracts, or 27% of the
total sample) is the most popular non-ﬁnancial measure, and includes production safety, economic safety,
political safety and corporate reputation. For example, in 2008, Huaxi Village (stock code 000936) used the
Table 6
Speciﬁc evaluation measures.
Contract number Percentage
Contracts that disclose evaluation measures 160
Panel A: Use of ﬁnancial measures
Contracts using ﬁnancial measures 160 100
Contracts using a single ﬁnancial measure 52 33
Proﬁt 43 27
Return on equity 4 3
Sales 1 1
EVA 1 1
Others 3 2
Contracts using multiple ﬁnancial measures 108 68
Proﬁt 103 64
Sales 62 39
Return on equity 51 32
Accounts receivable turnover 17 11
Operating cash ﬂows 13 8
Inventory turnover ratio 11 7
Asset value increment rate 11 7
Asset-liability ratio 11 7
Sales volume 8 5
Output of productions 6 4
Others 61 38
Panel B: Use of non-ﬁnancial measures
Contracts using non-ﬁnancial measures 79 49
Security 43 27
Project completion 19 12
Measures related to the Communist Party 15 9
Operations management 18 11
Development and growth 18 11
Product or service quality and innovation 10 6
Scientiﬁc research and technological innovation 9 6
Employee satisfaction 7 4
Job attitude, professionalism and learning ability 7 4
Staﬀ salaries 7 4
Others 41 26
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ﬁnancial measure is the implementation of projects, which is used in 19 contracts (12%). Other notable non-
ﬁnancial measures are company management and standard operations (11%), strategic development measures
(11%) and measures related to the development of the Communist Party of China (9%). Most of the non-
ﬁnancial measures are much more subjective than the more objective ﬁnancial measures. Thus, the execution
of these measures is worthy of further research.
Ittner et al. (1997) surveyed 114 executive compensation contracts with non-ﬁnancial measures in the
United States. Their results show that 42 contracts (36.8%) use customer satisfaction as a non-ﬁnancial
measure. Other non-ﬁnancial measures include non-ﬁnancial strategy completion status (28%), product
and service quality (21%), employee safety (16.6%) and market share (11.4%). The comparison shows
that whereas US companies are more likely to use measures of customer satisfaction, product quality
and employees, Chinese listed companies use fewer measures that reﬂect customer and employee
satisfaction.
Table 7 presents statistics on disclosure by year. From 2004 to 2010, companies disclosing evaluation mea-
sures always used ﬁnancial measures in their executive compensation contracts. In comparison, the use of non-
ﬁnancial measures experienced a signiﬁcant jump in 2007, which is consistent with our observation that more
companies have introduced non-ﬁnancial measures into their compensation contracts in recent years.
Table 7
Evaluation measures by year.
Total 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Contracts that disclose evaluation measures 160 21 15 8 14 34 32 36
Contracts using ﬁnancial measures 160 21 15 8 14 34 32 36
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Contracts using non-ﬁnancial measures 79 5 6 3 9 20 16 20
(49%) (24%) (40%) (38%) (64%) (59%) (50%) (56%)
Contracts using ﬁnancial measures with clear deﬁnitions 158 21 15 8 14 33 32 35
Contracts using ﬁnancial measures based on proﬁt measures 158 21 15 8 14 33 32 35
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Contracts using ﬁnancial measures based on non-proﬁt
measures
68 10 7 3 7 14 14 13
(43%) (48%) (47%) (38%) (50%) (42%) (44%) (37%)
Table 8
Evaluation measures by ownership.
Total Non-government
controlled
Local government
controlled
Central government
controlled
Contracts that disclose evaluation measures 160 49 81 30
Contracts using ﬁnancial measures 160 49 81 30
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Contracts using non-ﬁnancial measures 78 20 37 21
(49%) (41%) (46%) (70%)
Contracts using ﬁnancial measures with clear
deﬁnitions
158 49 80 29
Contracts using ﬁnancial measures based on
proﬁt measures
158 49 80 29
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Contracts using ﬁnancial measures based on
non-proﬁt measures
68 19 35 14
(43%) (39%) (44%) (48%)
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government- and non-government-controlled companies typically use at least one ﬁnancial measure in their
executive compensation contracts, and that there is at least one ﬁnancial measure of proﬁtability in all of
the contracts. However, there is a marked diﬀerence among the companies in the use of ﬁnancial measures
not related to proﬁtability, such as asset turnover and cash adequacy ratios. A total of 48% of the contracts
in central-government-controlled companies and 44% of the contracts in local-government-controlled
companies use ﬁnancial measures related to both non-proﬁtability and proﬁtability, compared with only
39% in non-government-controlled companies. Further, 70% of the contracts in central-government-
controlled companies, 46% of those in local-government-controlled companies and 41% of those in non-
government-controlled companies introduce non-ﬁnancial measures. The use of non-ﬁnancial measures is
clearly much higher in central government-controlled companies than in the other two types of companies.
Ittner et al. (1997) examine the factors that aﬀect the use of non-ﬁnancial measures in executive compensation
contracts in the United States, and ﬁnd that regulated companies, companies with more innovative strategies
and companies with noisier ﬁnancial measures tend to use non-ﬁnancial measures to evaluate executives. In
Chinese listed companies, the use of non-ﬁnancial measures diﬀers across years and ﬁrm types. More studies
are required to better understand the factors that drive these diﬀerences.
Table 9 presents statistics for the weighting of the ﬁnancial measures used in the sample compensation con-
tracts. Among the 228 contracts, only 57 clearly state the weight given to ﬁnancial measures in the evaluation
system. The minimum weight is 30% and the maximum is 100%, with an average of 76%. For example, Zhong
Bai Holding’s (stock code 000759) 2006 executive compensation contract includes ﬁnancial measures such as
net proﬁt less non-recurring items, operating income, net asset growth rate less non-recurring items and oper-
ating cash ﬂow per share. The weights of these measures are clearly stated to be 30%, 30%, 20% and 20%,
respectively.
Table 9
Weight of ﬁnancial measures used in executive compensation contracts.
Year Number
of contracts
Average
weight (%)
Minimum
weight (%)
Median
weight (%)
Maximum
weight (%)
Panel A. Financial measures by year
Total 57 76 30 80 100
2004 6 79 45 90 100
2005 4 89 55 100 100
2006 3 83 60 90 100
2007 8 61 30 60 100
2008 14 69 40 65 100
2009 11 79 40 80 100
2010 11 85 50 95 100
Panel B. Financial measures by company type
Non-government controlled 16 77 40 80 100
Local government controlled 29 75 30 70 100
Central government controlled 12 78 40 88 100
Total 57 76 30 80 100
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the average and median weight for the ﬁnancial measures is 83% and 100%, respectively, whereas after 2007
the corresponding ﬁgures are 74% and 70%, respectively. Panel B of Table 9 presents the statistics by company
type. It shows that the use of ﬁnancial measures in executive compensation contracts is slightly higher in cen-
tral-government-controlled companies than in the other two types.4.4. Performance standards in executive compensation contracts
Executive compensation contracts normally set certain performance standards. Companies then compare
the actual results with the performance standards to evaluate executives’ performance and determine their
compensation. In a monetary bonus plan, the performance standard of a performance evaluation measure
is a pre-determined target value. In addition to the performance evaluation measure and pay–performance
sensitivity, the performance standard is an important component of executive compensation contracts. As
expected, the level of compensation is diﬀerent if an executive inﬂuences the performance standards of the
evaluation measures. Murphy (2001) uses statistical data from 177 US companies’ compensation contracts
between 1996 and 1997 to study performance standards. The study shows that 125 companies used a total
of 219 accounting performance standards. Of these performance standards, 144 are based on a single standard
and 88 (61%) use budgeting values as the evaluation measure standard. Another 22 ﬁrms (15%) use past per-
formance as the standard, 13 (9%) use standards that were at the discretion of the board of directors and 6
(4%) use a ﬁxed value as the standard. Performance standards such as budget and past performance are
aﬀected by internal management and hence are categorized as internal standards. Industry standards, the cost
of capital and ﬁxed standards are normally not aﬀected by internal management, and hence are categorized as
external standards. Murphy (2001) shows that when past performance has more estimation noise than peer
performance, companies are more likely to use external standards such as industry performance and the cost
of capital. Companies that use internal standards such as past performance or budgeted performance ﬂuctuate
less in the level of executive compensation and carry out more earnings smoothing than companies that use
external performance standards. However, Murphy (2001) does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant ﬁrm performance diﬀer-
ences between companies using internal and external standards. Murphy explains that the choice of internal
or external standards may reﬂect a company’s selection of managers and board of directors: the board of
directors may prefer predictable and smooth performance and executives may prefer a predictable and more
stable compensation package.
Table 10 shows statistics on the performance standards disclosed in the executive compensation contracts
by the Chinese listed companies in our sample. In the 160 contracts disclosing 715 evaluation measures (refer
Table 10
Performance standards used in executive compensation contracts.
Total Non-government
controlled
Local government
controlled
Central government
controlled
Number of performance standards with
clear deﬁnitions
453 123 243 87
Using a single performance standard 440 97% 119 97% 239 98% 82 94%
Including
Internal standards 366 81% 106 86% 189 78% 71 82%
Budget 292 64% 84 68% 148 61% 60 69%
Past performance 74 16% 22 18% 41 17% 11 13%
External standards 74 16% 13 11% 50 21% 11 13%
Fixed value 59 13% 11 9% 40 16% 8 9%
Industry value 9 2% 0 0% 9 4% 0 0%
Cost of capital 6 1% 2 2% 1 0% 3 3%
Using multiple performance standards 13 3% 4 3% 4 2% 5 6%
Including
Budget and past performance 10 2% 4 3% 1 0% 5 6%
Budget and industry 1 0% 0 0% 1 0% 0 0%
Budget and cost of capital 1 0% 0 0% 1 0% 0 0%
Budget and ﬁxed value 1 0% 0 0% 1 0% 0 0%
Note: The percentage is calculated as the number of measures in each cell over the total number (453).
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440 (97%) use a single performance standard and the rest use multiple performance standards. For example,
Chi Tian Hua’s (stock code 600227) 2008 executive compensation contract uses past performance as a stan-
dard for the ROE measure. Shenzheng Energy (stock code 000027) uses budget value and industry perfor-
mance as standards to evaluate ROE performance. It also uses budget value and past performance as
standards to evaluate the proﬁt before tax measure in its 2008 compensation contract.
In our sample of contracts, 81% of the measures use a single internal standard as reference, with 64% based
on budget value and 17% based on past performance. Another 16% use a single external standard as reference,
with 13% based on a ﬁxed standard. Qianjiang Motor (stock code 000913) uses a ﬁxed ROE of 6.5% to eval-
uate its ROE performance measure. Shenzhen Tonge (stock code 000090) uses an ROE value from a govern-
ment regulation as its performance standard. Six measures use cost of capital as a performance standard. For
example, Jinxi Axle’s (stock code 600495) executive compensation contract uses the bank interest rate in the
same year as the performance standard to evaluate the ROE performance of its executives.
Among the 453 performance measures used between 2004 and 2010, 83% (81% of single standards and 2%
of multiple standards) use internal standards and 16% use external standards. The remainder use both internal
and external standards. These results are close to those reported by Murphy (2001), who ﬁnds that among 144
measures that use single standards, 85% use internal standards and 14% use external standards. Pan et al.
(2006) present statistics on the performance standards of 50 executive compensation contracts between
2002 and 2004. Their results show that 72% of the contracts use internal standards and 36% use external stan-
dards. However, their statistics are based on the number of companies rather than the number of performance
measures presented. Collectively, these results show consistently that most companies use internal standards as
their evaluation reference.
Table 10 presents the statistics by company type. In non-government-controlled companies, 123 ﬁnancial
measures clearly indicate performance standards, with 89% of the companies using internal standards and 11%
using external standards. In central-government-controlled companies, 87 ﬁnancial measures clearly indicate
performance standards, with 88% of the companies using internal standards and 12% using external stan-
dards. In local-government-controlled companies, 243 measures clearly indicate performance standards, with
78% of the companies using internal standards and 21% using external standards. It seems that local-govern-
ment-controlled companies use more external standards, especially ﬁxed and industry standards.
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Executive compensation normally includes a basic salary, annual bonuses, stock-based incentive com-
pensation, long-term incentive compensation and allowances and welfare payments. Jensen and Murphy
(1990) argue that compared with monetary compensation, stock-based compensation encourages manag-
ers to work harder to improve ﬁrm value. According to the 1997 statistics on CEO compensation struc-
tures in 1095 US companies, basic salary accounts for 34.4% of total compensation, monetary bonuses
account for 20.51% and stock-based incentive compensation value accounts for 37.56% on average. In
some companies, the proportion of stock-based incentive compensation is even larger. For example, Tim-
othy Cook, the CEO of Apple Inc., received a basic salary of US$900,017 (2.3%), stock-based incentive
compensation of US$37,618,000 (95.4%)8 and non-stock-based incentive compensation of US$900,000
(2.3%) in 2011.
According to the WIND database, as at March 16, 2012, 347 Chinese domestic companies had imple-
mented stock-based incentive compensation plans, representing 15% of all A-share listed companies. Among
the 201 companies that voluntarily disclosed their compensation contracts, only 32 implemented (or passed
board of directors proposals on) stock-based incentive plans, which is only 16% of the total. Thus, monetary
salaries, including basic salaries and performance compensation, are still the main component of executive
compensation in listed companies. As there is no requirement for listed companies to disclose the components
of executive compensation in their annual reports, we could not obtain detailed statistics on the components
for every company. However, among the 228 voluntarily disclosed compensation contracts, only 68 provide
the exact basic salary amounts. We thus collected the total executive compensation from their annual reports
to calculate the amount of performance compensation and then analyzed the relative weighting of the basic
salary and performance compensation.9
Of the 68 compensation contracts that disclosed the exact basic salary amounts, seven contracts from 2004
are excluded because their companies’ annual reports do not report the total executive compensation amount.
We exclude another two companies that do not disclose the total compensation in their annual reports, nine
companies that underwent general manager changes and nine companies that disclose total compensation
amounts that are lower than the basic salary amounts.10 Thus, only 41 contracts are available to examine
the relative weighting of basic salary and performance compensation. The data on total executive compensa-
tion was extracted from the RESSET ﬁnancial research database and missing data was manually collected
from the companies’ annual reports.
Panel A of Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics on performance compensation and basic salaries.
The average basic salary and performance compensation are RMB261,716 and RMB265,101, respectively.
The ratio of performance compensation to basic salary is 1.38 on average and the median ratio is 1.03,
indicating that performance compensation is generally higher than basic salaries. However, Panel B shows
that the average ratio varies with company type. In non-government-controlled companies, the ratio of
performance compensation to basic salary has an average of 1 and a median of 0.67. In local-govern-
ment-controlled companies, the average and median of the ratio are 1.63 and 1.36, respectively. In cen-
tral-government-controlled companies, the average and median of the ratio are 1.62 and 1.56,8 Apple Inc.’s 2011 executive compensation table shows the value to be US$37,618,000. The company granted 1 million restricted stocks
to the CEO, the fair value of which is computed based on the daily market price of the stock. Fifty percent of the restricted stocks have a
restricted trade period of ﬁve years and the other half has a restricted trade period of ten years. Thus, the annual incentive of the restricted
stocks is worth US$37,618,000 based on the 10-year average.
9 Note that the weighting of basic salary and performance compensation is based on ex post total compensation data rather than the
design of the compensation contract. Thus, a lower performance compensation amount may only indicate weak executive performance
rather than a lower incentive.
10 Seven companies’ executive total compensation is lower than the reported basic salary. For example, Star Hi-Tech (000676) discloses
its chairman’s basic compensation as RMB600,000 in its 2010 compensation contract, with a basic salary of RMB480,000 and an
allowance of RMB120,000. The 2010 annual report discloses the chairman’s total compensation before tax as RMB313,000. The actual
proﬁt is lower than the standard proﬁt and the compensation contract states that if this is the case, then the corresponding proportion will
be deducted from the executive’s basic salary.
Table 11
Descriptive statistics on compensation structure.
Number of
disclosures
Average
(RMB)
Minimum (RMB) Median (RMB) Maximum
(RMB)
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on basic salaries and performance compensation
Basic salary 41 261,716 24,000 180,000 1,080,800
Performance 41 265,101 1,600 200,000 1,079,600
Performance/basic salary 41 1.38 0.01 1.03 5.02
Panel B: Performance to basic salary ratio by ownership
Non-government controlled 16 1.00 0.04 0.67 4.00
Local government controlled 20 1.63 0.01 1.36 5.02
Central government controlled 5 1.62 0.03 1.56 3.06
Panel C: Relative weight of basic salary and performance compensation
Total Privately
owned
Local state-owned
enterprise
Central state-owned
enterprise
Performance compensation is lower than
basic salary
18 11 5 2
44% 69% 25% 40%
Performance compensation is the same as
or higher than basic salary
23 5 15 3
56% 31% 75% 60%
Total 41 16 20 5
Table 12
Methods for determining basic salaries.
Total Non-government
controlled
Local government
controlled
Central government
controlled
Total 228 89 98 41
Contracts that disclose the method of
determining basic salaries
108 28 60 20
Including
Basic salary is a ﬁxed value 58 18 31 9
(54%) (64%) (52%) (45%)
Basic salary is a multiple of staﬀ salaries 28 3 18 7
(26%) (11) (30%) (35%)
Basic salary is a percentage of total
remuneration
12 6 5 1
(11%) (21%) (8%) (5%)
Basic salary is a function of factors such as
assets and proﬁt
8 0 5 3
(7%) (0%) (8%) (15%)
Basic salary is a multiple of proﬁts 2 1 1 0
(2%) (4%) (2%) (0%)
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ment-controlled companies than in the other two types.
To further examine the proportion of basic salary and performance compensation in the sample contracts,
we classify the sample into two groups: one with a ratio higher than 1 and one with a ratio lower than 1. Panel
C in Table 11 shows the statistical results after the grouping. Among the 41 observations, 18 contracts (or
44%) have a ratio lower than 1. Of these 18 contracts, 11 (or 61%) are from non-government-controlled com-
panies, a signiﬁcantly higher proportion than the other two types of companies. This result is consistent with
that presented in Panel B. King Field (stock code 002239), a non-government-controlled company, disclosed a
compensation contract in 2008 that includes basic salaries (60%) and performance compensation (40%). The
results show that whereas non-government-controlled companies choose compensation structures with lower
incentive compensation, government-controlled companies and especially local-government-controlled com-
panies, prefer to use compensation structures with higher incentives.
Table 13
Formula for performance compensation calculation.
Total Non-government
controlled
Local government
controlled
Central government controlled
Contracts that disclose a formula 154 47 73 34
Including
Bonus = Fpay  b 59 38% 18 38% 30 41% 11 32%
Bonus = NI  b 63 41% 20 43% 31 42% 12 35%
Bonust=(NI  Equity  r)  b 9 6% 1 2% 3 4% 5 15%
Bonust = Bonust1= (1 + r)  b 10 6% 7 15% 2 3% 1 3%
Bonus = Apayemployee  m  b 11 7% 1 2% 5 7% 5 15%
Bonus = f(ROE) 2 1% 0 0% 2 3% 0 0%
Note: The percentage is calculated as the number of contracts in each cell over the total number of contracts for each category.
Bonus = Fpay  b is based on a ﬁxed salary, multiplied by coeﬃcient b. Fpay is a ﬁxed amount, usually the basic salary. The calculation of
coeﬃcient b is presented in Table 14.
Bonus = NI  b is based on proﬁt. NI may be the current year’s net income or another measure based on proﬁt.
Bonust = (NI-Equity  r)  b is based on the economic value added.
Bonust = Bonust1 =  (1 + r)  b is based on past performance compensation, where r is the growth rate.
Bonus = Apayemployee  m  b is based on multiples of the average compensation of all employees.
Bonus = f(ROE) is based on ROE.
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Basic salaries are typically determined by job responsibilities, which are not linked to a company’s
operating performance. This approach helps to protect executives’ interests by controlling the risk of per-
formance volatility. Table 12 presents a summary of the basic salary computation methods used in the
sample contracts. Among the 228 sample contracts, 108 disclose the methods of determining basic sal-
aries, representing 47% of the total contracts. Fifty-eight of these contracts (54%) use ﬁxed basic salaries.
The percentage is higher in non-government-controlled companies (18 contracts, or 64%) and lower in
central-government-controlled ﬁrms (nine contracts, or 45%). For example, Ningbo Marine (stock code
600279) states its general manager’s basic salary in 2004 to be RMB100,000. Twenty-eight contracts
(26%) determine basic salaries based on the average employee salary. For example, Kingray Technol-
ogy’s (stock code 600390) 2009 executive compensation contract states that basic salaries should be
based on W0  L  R  C, where W0 is ﬁve times the previous year’s national average employee salary
for government-controlled companies, L is an adjustment factor that is determined by ﬁrm size and
annual salaries adjustment coeﬃcient, R is the basic salary adjustment coeﬃcient and ranges from 0.8
to 1.2, and C is the weight that reﬂects an executive’s ranking (1 for the CEO and 0.6–0.8 for other
executives). The table also shows that whereas 30% and 35% of local- and central-government-controlled
companies respectively determine their executives’ basic salaries based on their employees’ basic salaries,
only 11% of non-government-controlled companies do so. Another 12 contracts (11%) regulate the pro-
portion of basic salaries in the total compensation package. For example, YingLiTe’s (stock code
000635) 2008 executive compensation contract states that the proportions of basic salary and perfor-
mance compensation are each 50%.
Eight contracts (7%) link basic salaries with performance measures and another two contracts (2%)
use a multiple of earnings to determine basic salaries. Lier Chemical (stock code 2258) states that its
2009 executive annual basic salaries are based on total assets, operating income, net proﬁt and return
on equity. iFlyTek (stock code 2230) states that the basic salary of the chairperson of the board of
directors should be 0.25% of the net proﬁt attributable to the shareholders of the parent companies
and that the basic salary of the general manager should be 80% of the chairperson’s basic annual salary.
It also states that the total basic salary of the chairperson and general manager should not be higher
than 1.5% of the budgeted net proﬁt attributable to the parent company as agreed by the board of
directors.
Table 14
Methods for calculating coeﬃcient b.
Total Non-government
controlled
Government
controlled
Local government
controlled
Central government
controlled
Total contracts 228 89 139 98 41
Contracts that do not disclose the
method of calculating b
112 59 53 41 12
49% 66% 38% 42% 29%
Contracts that disclose the method of
calculating b
116 30 86 57 29
Including
b is a ﬁxed value 15 4 11 6 5
13% 13% 13% 11% 17%
b = f (evaluation scores) 101 26 75 51 24
87% 87% 87% 89% 83%
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Table 13 presents statistics on the methods used to compute performance compensation. Among the 228
sample contracts, 154 disclose the determinants of performance compensation, some 68% of the total sample.
Fifty-eight (38%) of the 154 contracts use the ﬁxed compensation multiplied by a certain coeﬃcient (denoted
as b) to determine the performance compensation. Coeﬃcient b is typically determined by the performance
evaluation results, as illustrated in Table 14. For example, Shenzhen Zhenye (stock code 000006) states that
its executive annual incentive compensation should equal a personal incentive compensation base multiplied
by a company annual incentive compensation coeﬃcient multiplied by a personal evaluation coeﬃcient (b).
Sixty-three contracts (41%) determine executive compensation based on net proﬁt with a multiple of coef-
ﬁcient b. For example, Donger Erjiao’s (stock code 000423) executive compensation contract in 2004 states
that the annual performance compensation for all executives is 2% of the realized net proﬁt, and that the allo-
cation coeﬃcient b is determined by the individual executive’s performance evaluation. As such, the CEO’s
performance compensation should be (Net Income  2%  b), where b is the allocation coeﬃcient.
Nine contracts (6%) choose economic value-added (proﬁt less the cost of capital) as a basis to determine
performance compensation. For example, Banner Technology’s (stock code 002106) 2000 executive compen-
sation contract states that its general manager’s annual performance compensation should equal (performance
compensation base  2.5%), and that the annual performance compensation base should equal (net proﬁt of
the current year –10% of net assets at the beginning of the year).
Ten contracts (6%) determine the current year’s performance compensation based on the previous year’s
performance compensation. For example, Cangzhou Mingzhu’s (stock code 2108) 2009 compensation con-
tract states that the Year N performance compensation should equal the Year N – 1 performance compensa-
tion multiplied by the company performance evaluation coeﬃcient multiplied by a position evaluation
coeﬃcient multiplied by a time coeﬃcient.
Eleven contracts (7%) determine performance compensation based on a multiple of employee salaries. For
example, SZZT Electronics’ (stock code 002197) compensation contract in 2009 states that a general man-
ager’s performance compensation should equal p  b  c, where p is total employees’ salaries, b is a basic coef-
ﬁcient formed by personal performance and c is the performance salary payout ratio, which is determined by
the company’s performance.
Finally, two contracts determine executive performance compensation based on ROE. Feicai Holding’s
(000887) executive compensation contract in 2004 states that when the annual ROE is less than or equal to
0%, the annual performance compensation is 0; when it is above 0%, every additional 0.1% corresponds to
an increase of RMB600 in performance compensation; and when it is above 3%, 6%, 10% and 15%, every
additional 0.1% corresponds to increases of RMB900, RMB1,200, RMB2,400 and RMB3,600, respectively.
We also present the statistics by company type. While 43% of non-government-controlled companies and
42% of local-government-controlled companies determine performance compensation based on a multiple of
proﬁt, only 35% of central-government-controlled companies do so. By comparison, 15% of central-govern-
Table 15
Ceilings and ﬂoors for performance compensation.
Total Non-government
controlled
Local government
controlled
Central government
controlled
Performance compensation with a ceiling
Total 40 13 18 9
Multiple of the basic salary 19 4 10 5
Fixed value 10 7 3 0
Ceiling without deﬁnition 4 0 1 3
Multiple of last year’s salary 2 0 2 0
Multiple of net proﬁt 2 1 0 1
Ceiling for coeﬃcient b 1 1 0 0
Multiple of salary standards 1 0 1 0
Multiple of the average staﬀ salary 1 0 1 0
Performance compensation with a ﬂoor
Total 16 6 8 2
Fixed value (not zero) 7 6 1 0
Value of zero 6 0 5 1
Basic salary 1 0 1 0
Minimum wage of employees 1 0 1 0
Floor without deﬁnition 1 0 0 1
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local-government-controlled companies do so. These results are related to the Interim Measures to Evaluate
Central-government-controlled Enterprise Managers’ Performance published by the SASAC in 2010, which
recognizes EVA as an eﬀective evaluation measure. A total of 15% of private companies determine current
performance compensation on the basis of the previous year’s performance compensation, whereas only
3% of local- and central-government-controlled companies follow this approach. The last notable result is that
whereas 15% of central-government-controlled companies and 7% of local-government-controlled companies
determine performance compensation on the basis of a multiple of the average employee salary, only 2% of
non-government-controlled companies do so. This result indicates that government-controlled companies,
especially central-government-controlled companies, give more consideration to employee salaries when deter-
mining executive compensation, reﬂecting that executive compensation regulations do have an eﬀect on gov-
ernment-controlled companies.
Table 14 presents statistics on the methods of determining coeﬃcient b in the performance compensation
computation formula discussed in Table 13. From the 116 contracts in which coeﬃcient b could be deter-
mined, 87% state that coeﬃcient b is determined based on the evaluation results of the performance measures
and 13% give a ﬁxed value for the coeﬃcient. Central government-controlled companies have a greater ten-
dency to set b at a ﬁxed value than non-government and local-government-controlled companies.
To minimize the risk of exposure to executives, compensation contracts normally set a ceiling and ﬂoor for
performance compensation. Table 15 presents the statistics on performance compensation ceilings and ﬂoors.
Forty contracts provide a performance compensation ceiling. Among these, 19 calculate the ceiling as a multi-
ple of the annual basic salary and 10 set a speciﬁc amount for the ceiling. Only 16 contracts provide a perfor-
mance compensation ﬂoor. Seven of these 16 contracts give a speciﬁc amount and another six set the ﬂoor at 0.
5. Conclusion and directions for future research
This study analyzes 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed ﬁrms
between 2004 and 2010, and ﬁnds the following main results.
First, central-government-controlled companies disclose the most information on compensation packages,
followed by local- and non-government-controlled companies. We mainly focus on the disclosure of perfor-
mance evaluation measures and compensation calculation methods.
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sures, with only three companies using market return measures. We observe that an increasing number of
companies have used non-ﬁnancial measures since 2007. In addition, non-ﬁnancial measures are more widely
used by central-government-controlled companies than by their local- and non-government-controlled
counterparts.
Third, the performance standards used in evaluation measures are still mainly based on internal standards,
such as past performance and company budgets. Very few companies choose industry performance, cost of
capital and other external standards as standards to evaluate executive performance. Murphy (2001) argues
that it is easier for executives to manipulate internal standards than external standards. Thus, our results indi-
cate that Chinese listed companies fail to consider executives’ inﬂuence on performance standards when setting
executive compensation.
Fourth, 57 of the sample contracts disclose the weight given to ﬁnancial measures in the evaluation system.
Compared with the years before 2007, both the average and median weight accorded to ﬁnancial measures
drops signiﬁcantly after 2007. We cannot oﬀer any explanation for this change: it may be due to changing
executive compensation regulations introduced by the government or to the application of the new accounting
standards in 2007. We also ﬁnd that the weight given to ﬁnancial measures in central-government-controlled
companies is slightly higher than that in local- and non-government-controlled companies.
Fifth, the structure of executive compensation consists of basic salary and performance compensation, but
relatively little stock-based compensation. Most contracts set basic salaries at a certain ﬁxed value. Some
contracts set them based on a multiple of the average employee salary. The basic salary amount is typically
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the performance compensation amount, which is about half of the total com-
pensation. However, government-controlled companies oﬀer greater performance compensation than non-
government-controlled companies.
Finally, most companies determine performance compensation based on proﬁt or a ﬁxed value in combi-
nation with the results of the executives’ performance evaluation. However, some companies determine per-
formance compensation based on past performance or average employee compensation.
Our survey results shed light on future executive compensation research in China. We have identiﬁed ﬁve
future research directions. First, performance evaluation measures vary signiﬁcantly across companies. It
would be interesting to examine why companies choose diﬀerent performance evaluation measures. Such
research would help to determine how companies should choose and balance the use of ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial measures, and whether performance standards should be based on internal standards such as bud-
geting and past performance, or on external standards such as industry performance and cost of capital.
Answering these questions would help us to better understand how companies construct their compensation
packages.
The second direction is to determine which measures are more eﬀective in motivating executives and mit-
igating agency problems. The answer to this question could help companies to design more eﬀective compen-
sation contracts. The reactions of management to diﬀerent measures are also unknown. The literature focuses
mainly on managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings to achieve their personal goals. However, there are
large variations in performance evaluation measures and performance standards. How can managers manip-
ulate so many measures and standards? Do they exhibit diﬀerent kinds of opportunistic behavior? An under-
standing of managers’ reactions to performance measures would be useful in designing better compensation
contracts.
The third direction is to examine what motivates companies to voluntarily disclose compensation
contracts. There is a need for further analysis on the disclosure of company compensation policies. It
would also be interesting to examine how investors react to the voluntary disclosure of executive
compensation contracts. These research avenues would increase our comprehension of the function of
compensation contracts in company operations and oﬀer policy implications for regulators of disclosure
policies.
Fourth, due to a lack of detailed information on the compensation regulations introduced by local govern-
ments, additional surveys and ﬁeld studies are required to understand how local governments regulate com-
pensation and how central government regulations are enforced by local governments. How would diﬀerent
Y. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 211–231 231regulations by local governments aﬀect company choices? Such research would help us to understand the
structure of compensation contracts in local-government-controlled companies.
Finally, previous studies often suﬀer from an omitted variable problem in their pay–performance sensitivity
analyses. In addition to the various forms of accounting proﬁt evaluation measures, contracts contain many
non-accounting-proﬁt measures, such as operating eﬃciency measures and cash ﬂow measures, that are nor-
mally not controlled for in previous studies. Many companies also use non-ﬁnancial measures. These omitted
variables may also have aﬀected the current research ﬁndings.Acknowledgements
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